

## Al You Ready? Attention. Go!

Raphaël Marichez Chief Security Officer, Southern Europe Palo Alto Networks Is there a common understanding of AI?

- Watt steam engine (around 1775)
  - Watt linked a steam regulator valve to a centrifugal governor to roughly correct the speed with a feedback loop
  - These improvements allowed the steam engine to replace the water wheel and horses as the main sources of power for British industry, thereby freeing it from geographical constraints and becoming one of the main drivers in the Industrial Revolution.







- Algorithms (processes) leading to a decision, a parameter change, a switch between models...)
- And of course traditional infrastructure

(S&P Global Market Intelligence, 2020)

From laaS, SaaS to "Al as a Service"



Al is the key of the future of technology

If you want to enter by the door, you need to own the key, not the door itself.



(August 2020)

## can cause TikTok to be unsellable with its algorithm

The sale of TikTok to an American company is complicated at times. Microsoft is the main candidate for "Western TikTok" as we saw at the time. Nevertheless, **a new law in China may make the sale more complicated** or even not viable if the authorities of the eastern country so decide.



#### Al introduces new threat landscape



Al lifecycle (by ENISA)



Al introduces new threat landscape



Al assets' caterogies

(by ENISA)



Al introduces new threat landscape



Al Threat Taxonomy (by ENISA)



- Nefarious activity / abuse
  - ACL / Group permissions inheritance  $\Rightarrow$  implicit **privilege escalation attacks**
  - Adversarial examples (perturbations imperceptible to the human eye)  $\Rightarrow$  impact on ML models
  - Insider attacks, hard-to-detect **parameter changes**
  - Limited, biased, erroneous or tampered input dataset (secrets, lack of understanding...)
  - Insert attacks on training datasets (eg. certain pixel pattern for a surveillance camera / image classifier)
  - **Data poisoning / tampering** (legitimate or illegitimate access) ⇒ Adversely affect AI operations, biases
  - Flawed or poisoned schemas or compromised cloud-based models (backdoor in libraries...)
  - **3rd parties models** backdoors or biases
  - Compromise of **data brokers** (poisoning via insertion, filtering)  $\Rightarrow$  Biases in the decision process
  - **DDoS** attacks (storage, CPU...)
  - **Timing attacks** (public interfaces)  $\Rightarrow$  loss of confidentiality
  - ML model confidentiality
  - Unauthorized access to data sets and data transfer process, or to models' code

- Legal or privacy concerns
  - **Unintentional data breaches** (personal data, models' code, weak encryption...)
  - Disclosure of **Personal Information** by correlation, profiling users, lack of randomization...
  - Lack of **data governance policies** (when personal data are processed)
  - Lack of data protection **compliance** of 3rd parties providing or processing data
  - **SLA breaches** with 3rd parties
  - Vendor lock-in (libraries, data storage...)



#### Nefarious activity/abuse

"intended actions that target ICT systems, infrastructure, and networks by means of malicious acts with the aim to either steal, alter, or destroy a specified target".

#### Eavesdropping/Interception/ Hijacking

"actions aiming to listen, interrupt, or seize control of a third party communication without consent".

#### **Physical attacks**

"actions which aim to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorised access to physical assets such as infrastructure, hardware, or interconnection".

#### **Unintentional Damage**

"destruction, harm, or injury of property or persons and results in a failure or reduction in usefulness".

#### **Failures or malfunctions**

"Partial or full insufficient functioning of an asset (hardware or software)".

#### Outages

"unexpected disruptions of service or decrease in quality falling below a required level".

#### Disaster

"a sudden accident or a natural catastrophe that causes great damage or loss of life".

#### Legal

"legal actions of third parties (contracting or otherwise), in order to prohibit actions or compensate for loss based on applicable law".



## Artificial intelligence for cybersecurity is not an option!

- Surface attack discovery
   With massive cloud practices adoption
   and exponentially growing attack surface
   (devices, softwares, data, connections, nodes...)
- New era for the honeypots...



• Unit 42 latest blog post (22 Nov. 2021) Observing Attacks Against Hundreds of Exposed Services in Public Clouds https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/



Notorious ransomware groups such as **REvil** and **Mespinoza** are known to exploit exposed services to gain initial access to victims' environments.

Using a honeypot infrastructure of 320 nodes deployed globally, **Unit 42** researchers aim to better understand the attacks against exposed services in public clouds.

#### 80% of the 320 honeypots were compromised within 24 hours and all of the honeypots were compromised within a week

- On average, each SSH honeypot was compromised 26 times daily.
- One threat actor compromised 96% of our 80 Postgres honeypots globally within 30 seconds.
- 85% of the attacker IPs were observed only on a single day. Layer 3 IP-based firewalls are ineffective as attackers rarely reuse the same IPs to launch attacks. A list of malicious IPs created today will likely become outdated tomorrow.



#### **AI-enabled attackers**



## Artificial intelligence for cybersecurity is not an option!

![](_page_12_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_12_Figure_2.jpeg)

Number of days an attacker IP was observed

minutes

![](_page_12_Picture_5.jpeg)

1 day 85.2%

## Artificial intelligence for cybersecurity is not an option!

![](_page_13_Picture_1.jpeg)

Unit 42 applied firewall policies to block IPs from known network scanners. The firewall policy blocks the IPs that have been scanning a specific application daily in the past 30 days.

Blocking known scanner IPs is ineffective in mitigating attacks. Number of attackers in 30 days per honeypot

![](_page_13_Figure_5.jpeg)

![](_page_13_Picture_6.jpeg)

## Artificial intelligence for cybersecurity is not an option!

• Cyber threat intelligence management

#### Challenge:

Prevent your collected CTI from being obsolete before dissemination across your infrastructure

- Al is a game changer for the offensive part
- The attacker isn't subject to national regulations

He can practice:

- Deception (aversary learning data)
- Low-noise attacks (undetectable by human eyes)
- Try, fail and try again (while **we** can't!)

![](_page_14_Figure_10.jpeg)

![](_page_14_Picture_11.jpeg)

## Artificial intelligence benefits for cybersecurity

These 5 items are aligned with Gartner's PR on "Security & Risk Management Summit Day 4 Highlights"

#### Infrastructure protection

Classify patterns (applications rather than network protocols, file contents rather than extensions...) Analyse system calls within binaries (static analysis or living sandboxes...) Correlate with IPs, hosting infrastructure, network activity to map interaction graphs Correlate across time, to classify known behaviours and alert on unseen behaviour

#### Identity & Access management

Identity profiling Entitlements (mainly in public cloud permissions graphs)

#### Risk management

Suggestions based on new software or 3rd parties Find and factorize similar controls or rules across different subsidiaries or infrastructures

#### Application and Data Security

Classify bad / good applications based on seen behaviour, and/or reputation Classify text/images patterns (mixed) to trigger DLP techniques

#### Security Operations

Most obvious use case (alert fatigue, repeatable low-value tasks...)

![](_page_15_Picture_12.jpeg)

## Artificial intelligence benefits for cybersecurity

#### General recommendations:

- Al is a collection of complementary techniques, it's not magical, it's not a product
- Misunderstanding AI can cause AI malfunction and misuses!
- Al doesn't replace human. It changes what humans do (in a better way, we expect)
  - Automation replaces humans
  - Automation is enabled by AI with growing complexity infrastructures overwhelming humans capacity
- Your AI should always be explainable. Measure it to improve or fix it.
- Challenge your Al's results with your field expertise.
- Al value grows with good data input and supervision. Supervise it to improve or fix it.

![](_page_16_Picture_10.jpeg)

![](_page_17_Figure_0.jpeg)

#### 

## Legacy organization structure

"We ask the most inexperienced "Tier 1" analyst to distinguish between APTs and commodity threats. Does this work?"

### SIEMs and our obsession for data

![](_page_19_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_19_Figure_2.jpeg)

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### The automation maturity model and automation journey

![](_page_20_Figure_1.jpeg)

© Microsoft Cyber Defense https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/08/03/top-5-best-practices-to-automate-security-operations/

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## **Example automation benefits for SecOps functions**

![](_page_21_Figure_1.jpeg)

#### More time to focus on what matters.

![](_page_21_Picture_3.jpeg)

### Focus People Effort on Right Side of Cyber Attack Lifecycle

![](_page_22_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_22_Picture_2.jpeg)

## **Continuous Improvement of Alerts and Hunting**

![](_page_23_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_23_Picture_2.jpeg)

## Log and Alert Volume (90 days)

![](_page_24_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_24_Picture_2.jpeg)

## Internally, Cortex XSOAR does the work of ~9 virtual FTEs

Automation Type	Count	Analyst Hours Saved
Enrich Alerts	1090	635.8 hours
De-duplicate alerts	7,783	648.6 hours
Ask user for more details (Email/Slack)	308	128.3 hours
Request re-image with IT	5	2.1 hours
Coordinate password reset	4	1.7 hours
GCP Remediation	33	16.5 hours
Other Jobs*	*	29.8 hours

![](_page_25_Figure_2.jpeg)

\*PhishMe metrics, RSS feed job, content update job, hunting assignments and metrics, daily monitoring ticket creation

![](_page_25_Picture_4.jpeg)

![](_page_25_Picture_6.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_0.jpeg)

- Thank you!
- We presented:
  - Root components of Al,
  - Its subsequent (new) threats
  - AI as an opportunity for the attacker
     So why it's not something you can deny
  - Al as an opportunity for the defender
  - Operational use case with SOC automation

![](_page_26_Picture_8.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Picture_9.jpeg)

![](_page_27_Picture_0.jpeg)

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![](_page_27_Picture_3.jpeg)