GNU

taler.net
taler-systems.com

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What is Taler?

https://taler.net/en/

Taler is an electronic instant payment system.

- Uses electronic coins stored in **wallets** on customer's device
- Like **cash**
- Pay in **existing currencies** (i.e. EUR, USD, BTC), or use it to create new **regional currencies**

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However, Taler is

- *not* a currency
- *not* a long-term store of value
- *not* a network or instance of a system
- *not* decentralized
- *not* based on proof-of-work or proof-of-stake
- *not* a speculative asset / "get-rich-quick scheme"

Design principles

https://taler.net/en/principles.html

GNU Taler must ...

1. ... be implemented as **free software**.
2. ... protect the **privacy of buyers**.
3. ... must enable the state to **tax income** and crack down on illegal business activities.
4. ... prevent payment fraud.
5. ... only **disclose the minimal amount of information necessary**.
6. ... be usable.
7. ... be efficient.
8. ... avoid single points of failure.
9. ... foster **competition**.

Taler Overview

https://taler.net/papers/chaum-blind-signatures.pdf



The Taler Software Ecosystem

https://taler.net/en/docs.html

Taler is based on modular components that work together to provide a complete payment system:

- **Exchange:** Service provider for digital cash
  - Core exchange software (cryptography, database)
  - Air-gapped key management, real-time **auditing**
  - LibEuFin: Modular integration with banking systems
- **Merchant:** Integration service for existing businesses
  - Core merchant backend software (cryptography, database)
  - Back-office interface for staff
  - Frontend integration (E-commerce, Point-of-sale)
- **Wallet:** Consumer-controlled applications for e-cash
  - Multi-platform wallet software (for browsers & mobile phones)
  - Wallet backup storage providers
  - **Anastasis**: Recovery of lost wallets based on secret splitting

Architecture of Taler



Usability of Taler

https://demo.taler.net/

1. Install browser extension.
2. Visit the `bank.demo.taler.net` to withdraw coins.
3. Visit the `shop.demo.taler.net` to spend coins.

Example: The Taler Snack Machine[1]

Integration of a MDB/ICP to Taler gateway.
Implementation of a NFC or QR-Code to Taler wallet interface.



[1] by M. Boss and D. Hofer

Example: The Taler Snack Machine[2]

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How does it work?

https://taler.net/papers/thesis-dold-phd-2019.pdf

We use a few ancient constructions:

- Cryptographic hash function (1989)
- Blind signature (1983)
- Schnorr signature (1989)
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (1976)
- Cut-and-choose zero-knowledge proof (1985)

But of course we use modern instantiations.

Definition: Taxability

We say Taler is taxable because:

- Merchant's income is visible from deposits.
- Hash of contract is part of deposit data.
- State can trace income and enforce taxation.

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Limitations:

- withdraw loophole
- *sharing* coins among family and friends

Exchange setup: Create a denomination key (RSA)

1. Pick random primes p, q.
2. Compute $n := pq$,
   $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
3. Pick small $e < \phi(n)$ such that
   $d := e^{-1} \mod \phi(n)$ exists.
4. Publish public key (e, n).



Merchant: Create a signing key (EdDSA)

- pick random m mod o as private key
- $M = mG$ public key

m

M

Capability: $m \Rightarrow$ 

Customer: Create a planchet (EdDSA)

- Pick random c mod o private key
- $C = cG$ public key



Capability: $c \Rightarrow$ 

Customer: Blind planchet (RSA)

1. Obtain public key (e, n)
2. Compute $f := FDH(C)$, $f < n$.
3. Pick blinding factor $b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
4. Transmit $f' := fb^e \mod n$



Exchange: Blind sign (RSA)

1. Receive f'.
2. Compute $s' := f'^d \mod n$.
3. Send signature s'.



Customer: Unblind coin (RSA)

1. Receive s'.
2. Compute $s := s'b^{-1} \mod n$



Customer: Build shopping cart



Merchant: Propose contract (EdDSA)

1. Complete proposal D.
2. Send D, $EdDSA_m(D)$



Customer: Spend coin (EdDSA)

1. Receive proposal D, $EdDSA_m(D)$.
2. Send s, C, $EdDSA_c(D)$



Merchant and Exchange: Verify coin (RSA)

https://taler.net/papers/euro-bearer-online-2021.pdf

$$s^e \stackrel{?}{\equiv} FDH(C) \mod n$$



The exchange does not only verify the signature, but also checks that the coin was not double-spent.

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

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Taler is an online payment system.

Giving change

It would be inefficient to pay EUR 100 with 1 cent coins!

- Denomination key represents value of a coin.
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Key goals:

- maintain unlinkability
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Method:

- Contract can specify to only pay *partial value* of a coin.
- Exchange allows wallet to obtain *unlinkable change* for remaining coin value.

Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

1. Create private keys $c, t \mod o$
2. Define $C = cG$
3. Define $T = tG$
4. Compute DH
   $cT = c(tG) = t(cG) = tC$



Strawman solution

Given partially spent private coin key c_{old}:

1. Pick random c_{new} mod o private key
2. $C_{new} = c_{new} G$ public key
3. Pick random b_{new}
4. Compute $f_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$, $m < n$.
5. Transmit $f'_{new} := f_{new} b^e_{new}$ mod n

... and sign request for change with c_{old}.



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

Problem: Owner of c_{new} may differ from owner of c_{old}!

Customer: Transfer key setup (ECDH)

Given partially spent private coin key c_{old}:

1. Let $C_{old} := c_{old} G$ (as before)
2. Create random private transfer key $t \mod o$
3. Compute $T := tG$
4. Compute $X := c_{old}(tG) = t(c_{old} G) = tC_{old}$
5. Derive c_{new} and b_{new} from X
6. Compute $C_{new} := c_{new} G$
7. Compute $f_{new} := FDH(C_{new})$
8. Transmit $f'_{new} := f_{new} b^e_{new}$



Cut-and-Choose



Exchange: Choose!

Exchange sends back random $\gamma \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ to the customer.

Customer: Reveal

1. If $\gamma = 1$, send t_2, t_3 to exchange
2. If $\gamma = 2$, send t_1, t_3 to exchange
3. If $\gamma = 3$, send t_1, t_2 to exchange

Exchange: Verify ($\gamma = 2$)





Exchange: Blind sign change (RSA)

1. Take $f'_{new,\gamma}$.
2. Compute $s' := f'^{d}_{new,\gamma} \mod n$.
3. Send signature s'.



Customer: Unblind change (RSA)

1. Receive s'.
2. Compute $s := s' b_{new,\gamma}^{-1} \mod n$.



Exchange: Allow linking change

Given C_{old}

return T_γ, $s := s' b_{new,\gamma}^{-1} \mod n$.



Customer: Link (threat!)

1. Have c_{old}.
2. Obtain T_γ, s from exchange
3. Compute $X_\gamma = c_{old}\, T_\gamma$
4. Derive $c_{new,\gamma}$ and $b_{new,\gamma}$ from X_γ
5. Unblind $s := s' b_{new,\gamma}^{-1} \mod n$



Refresh protocol summary

- Customer asks exchange to convert old coin to new coin
- Protocol ensures new coins can be recovered from old coin

$\Rightarrow$ New coins are owned by the same entity!

Thus, the refresh protocol allows:

- To give unlinkable change.
- To give refunds to an anonymous customer.
- To expire old keys and migrate coins to new ones.
- To handle protocol aborts.

Transactions via refresh are equivalent to sharing a wallet.

Taler: Project Status

https://git.taler.net/

- Cryptographic protocols and core exchange component are stable
- Internal alpha deployment with a commercial bank in progress
- Discussions with various central banks
- R&D focus:
  - P2P payments with KYC
  - Privacy-preserving age restrictions on coins
  - Programmable money
  - UX for financial inclusion

How to support?

Join:	https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/taler, irc://irc.freenode.net/#taler
Develop:	https://bugs.taler.net/, https://git.taler.net/
Teach:	https://docs.taler.net/, https://git.taler.net/marketing.git
Translate:	https://weblate.taler.net/, translation-volunteer@taler.net
Integrate:	https://docs.taler.net/
Donate:	https://gnunet.org/ev
Invest:	https://taler-systems.com/

Do you have any questions?

https://taler.net/en/bibliography.html

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